A Killer in the Ranks

Jan 1, 2009 12:00 PM, By Tom Zind, Freelance Writer

Master Electricians Todd Lincoln, left, and Mike Sharpe inspect behind a male shower facility at Forward Operating Base Prosperity in Baghdad, checking for proper grounding and bonding. They are Stanley Baker Hill contractors and part of two combined Quality Assurance Representative teams managed by Task Force SAFE and the Defense Contract Management Agency. (Department of Defense photo by Petty Officer 1st Class Kristin Fitzsimmons)

Yet even in cases where systems have been installed to more mainstream codes, fundamental considerations appear to have been overlooked. According to Jim Childs, a Task Force SAFE master electrician employed by a military contractor, many hardstand buildings have electrical systems employing a TT earthing system that is permitted in the British Standards, which he says dictated the construction of many Iraqi structures. In a TT system, the protective earth connection of the consumer is provided by a local connection to earth, independent of any earth connection at the generator. It is, however, uniquely unsuited to Iraq.

“The problem is to install that to the British code either a residual current device must be used, or a second method involves maintaining a permanent and reliable low-resistance ground path through the earth. That's impossible to reliably achieve in the sandy soils of Iraq,” Childs says.

Many Iraqi buildings constructed to British standards, however, do rely on such a local earth connection, Childs notes. Consequently, many of their systems are inherently unsafe, failing to deliver low enough electrical resistance to ensure correct operation of a circuit earth fault protection device and sufficient repeatability — the ability to repeatedly carry fault currents. The fix, he says, will likely entail shoring up local ground connections, where possible, and employing residual current devices.

“Local earth connections have caused a lot of the shock problems, so we're going to be focused on getting these systems up to standard,” he says.

A similar electrical standards gap exists with containerized housing units (CHUs), temporary mobile structures that are widely used as office space and housing. Grounding and other electrical safety problems have been noted in many of these structures, which have largely been assembled in other countries (and possibly to a variety of different standards), before arriving in Iraq.

“The contractors that were responsible for securing these CHUs each used the electrical code that was present in the contract let by the military contracting agency that handled them,” Gabbert says.

Fire Protection Specialist Tom May, left, and John “Rudy” Rulapaugh examine a lighting fixture for safety and functional use at Forward Operating Base Prosperity. Stanley Baker Hill contractors, these men are part of one of more than 30 teams that are currently conducting inspections of fire and electrical systems in Iraq, including grounding and bonding of all facilities according to the NEC. (Department of Defense photo by Petty Officer 1st Class Kristin Fitzsimmons)

Some electrical safety problems can also be traced to the Iraq electrical infrastructure. Power frequency surges, combined with haphazardly designed and constructed service to buildings and substandard fixtures, are partly being blamed for hundreds of fires. Childs, who prior to joining the SAFE effort was a U.S. Army Corps of Engineers employee working on Iraq electrical transmission system upgrades, says an unstable grid has caused power fluctuations that have a probable link to many electrical fires.

“Generators going up and down — and problems with steady voltage — have led to a lot of lighting ballast issues,” he says. “At many fire scenes, we've found ballast problems to be the cause. Part of the solution will involve putting in-line fuses to the fluorescent lighting so when there are spikes, instead of a transformer heating up the fuse will blow.”

The military is also pinning some of the blame for incidents on human factors, notably lax attention to basic electrical safety by personnel. “Housekeeping deficiencies” and widespread use of devices (such as power strips and adapters), which lack proper certification and fail to safeguard against power surges/overloading, have magnified the dangers of wiring, bonding, and grounding problems. Consequently, one of SAFE's missions is formulating a comprehensive electrical safety awareness and education campaign.

Fixing blame

A similar effort on a macro scale may have been lacking from the earliest stages of the U.S. action in Iraq. Congressional testimony by military, government, and civilian witnesses suggest inattention or deliberate decisions made by both the military and civilian contractors may have helped create, exacerbate, and prolong unsafe electrical system conditions in buildings across Iraq. Possible explanations range from poorly drafted military contractor contracts and a lack of basic electrical expertise to chain-of-command/communications breakdowns and the “fog of war” that can render the best intentions and plans inoperable.

One military contractor, KBR, Inc., has drawn the lion's share of scrutiny for the missteps. The Houston-based company has held the contract for providing a range of services to the military in Iraq, a list that includes electrical service-related work. But its competency and performance in that capacity has been called into question.

Most notably, KBR's performance has been closely examined in connection with Maseth's electrocution. Testimony at last July's House Committee hearing investigating Iraq electrical safety, and investigations by the committee staff, raised the possibility that KBR workers may have been aware of electrical grounding problems at the Radawaniyah Palace Complex, where Maseth died, but failed to fix them.

An Army investigation determined that Maseth died when the breaker, capacitor, and internal fuse failed on an overheated, ungrounded water pump, allowing electrical current to flow through metal pipes supplying the shower. The July hearing examined allegations that a soldier who occupied Maseth's quarters prior to Maseth's arrival had been shocked in the same shower months earlier and had submitted a request to fix the problem, which would have been routed to KBR.